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Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1590 (2005), in which the Council requested me to keep it regularly informed of the progress in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, respect for the ceasefire and the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). The report also provides an assessment of the overall situation in the country since my previous report to the Council, dated 23 June 2006 (S/2006/426).

II. Implementation of the major elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

2. When I attended the inauguration of the presidency of the Government of National Unity and the signing of the Interim National Constitution in Khartoum on 9 July 2005, I called on the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to fulfil their obligations under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement promptly and completely. One year later, the parties are in the process of implementing some of the security arrangements set out in the Agreement, while there has not been much progress in respect of their power — and wealth-sharing obligations. Indeed, the parties continue to contest the interpretation of several aspects of the Agreement, and have neglected other commitments.

3. UNMIS and the wider United Nations system have continued to play a key role in support of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In accordance with its Security Council mandate, the peacekeeping Mission has provided good offices and political support to the parties, monitored and verified their security arrangements and offered assistance in a number of areas, including governance, recovery and development.

4. Overall, the parties' efforts to implement the security provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement have reduced the likelihood of future conflict. The continuing redeployment of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) from southern Sudan is generally on schedule, although the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) has accused SAF forces of concentrating around oilfields in the region bordering between the north and the south, rather than redeploying further north. In the

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months ahead, it will be crucial for the transfers of military command to take place in all areas in southern Sudan.

5. In its meeting held on 4 July, the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, created under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, established that SPLA had completed its redeployment from eastern Sudan. The redeployment of 5,672 troops out of a declared strength of 8,763 was verified by UNMIS. The troops unaccounted for were considered to have abandoned SPLA. The completion of the redeployment marked an important milestone in the implementation of the Agreement, as well as the end of the UNMIS monitoring mandate in the east of the country. UNMIS subsequently commenced its withdrawal from that region.

6. Comprehensive Peace Agreement security mechanisms, such as the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee and the Area Joint Military Committees, are largely functioning as intended, investigating violations and resolving disputes through discussions. These mechanisms played a significant role in the peaceful resolution of a number of incidents that could have triggered wider conflict, notably, the March ambush of an unarmed convoy north of Abyei, and the August clash between off-duty SPLA and SAF officers in the Rubkona market in Unity State, in which eight civilians and three soldiers were killed.

7. However, southern Sudan is still suffering from insecurity due to the presence of other armed groups, communal violence and forced disarmament campaigns. While SPLA has absorbed much of the former Southern Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), other armed groups remain a major threat throughout southern Sudan. The proliferation of small arms has contributed to the loss of hundreds of lives in communal clashes over land, water and grazing rights. An SPLA operation intended to disarm the rogue White Army at Jonglei in May sparked serious armed clashes. The parties have fallen well behind schedule on the incorporation of other armed groups into their forces. The Other Armed Groups Collaborative Committee met for only the second time, in Juba on 5 August, agreeing, however, that the parties would alternately chair regular meetings in the future. While each party has provided the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee with a list of aligned other armed groups, their actual alignment status, composition and location remain vague.

8. Also, the formation of Joint Integrated Units has been slow. The parties are approximately 18 months behind schedule on this important aspect and are unlikely to meet the 1 October 2006 deadline for the completion of co-location, training and deployment of the Units. At the same time, the parties have taken the first step of co-locating such units in Juba, Torit and Khartoum. However, in order for the Units to be truly effective and for them to fill security gaps left by SPLA and SAF redeployments, they need additional training, as well as budgetary and material support. Much also remains to be done in the area of integrating the units and defining their command structures.

9. At meetings of the Ceasefire Political Commission and through the Joint Defence Board, both parties have identified the need and expressed their desire for international support for the establishment of Joint Integrated Units. In order to advance the issue, UNMIS has invited them to submit a formal request to the international community. In addition, on 9 August the UNMIS Force Commander convened a meeting with representatives of embassies in Khartoum to discuss areas in which the international community can assist in training for the Units. For its part, the Government of Southern Sudan will require substantial international

assistance to restructure, train and equip SPLA while developing the administrative capacity to support a modern army. Some SPLA soldiers have not been paid for many months, which has led to isolated clashes and instances of insubordination. Comprehensive Peace Agreement-mandated troop reductions will also require international support for a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration effort.

10. International support will also be important for the reform of the rest of the Sudanese national security sector. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement requires the parties to adopt a National Security Act to govern the National Security Service and create a National Security Council charged with implementing reforms. The UNMIS mandate includes helping the parties restructure the Sudanese police service with support from bilateral and multilateral assistance programmes. The parties have made little progress at the national level, however. While key security agencies are reviewing draft amendments to the existing National Security Act, no proposals have been released for public comment.

11. Despite some positive signs on the security side, the parties are well behind schedule in implementing the power- and wealth-sharing aspects of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, where there is little progress to report. In the key area of oil, they continue to disagree on whether the National Petroleum Commission, on which both parties are represented, should be an advisory or a decision-making body, on the nature of its relationship with the Ministry of Energy and Mining and on its participation in oil contract negotiations. In this regard, the Ministry needs to display further transparency to ensure fairness and accuracy in oil-revenue calculations.

12. The related north-south border issues have proved similarly contentious. While the Technical Ad Hoc Border Committee met once during the reporting period, it has not yet commenced substantive work on border delineation, and was delayed by the onset of the rains. This task is urgent because the lack of an agreed delineation of the north-south border hinders or confuses obligations relating to military redeployment, the distribution of oil revenues, Joint Integrated Unit formation and, eventually, the referendum to confirm the unity of the Sudan or allow the secession of the south.

13. Similarly, the parties have made no progress on implementing the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area, since NCP rejected the Abyei Boundaries Commission report issued in July 2005. Meanwhile, the failure of the presidency to appoint a local Executive Council or Abyei Area Council has left the people of that region largely without formal policing, public sanitation and health services. Abyei remains a serious potential flashpoint with regard to implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

14. The parties' difficulty in reaching decisions and compromises has slowed implementation in a number of other areas. The Ceasefire Political Commission has proved unable to resolve a number of issues on its agenda, including restrictions imposed on UNMIS freedom of movement north of Abyei town and the status of disputed redeployment assembly areas. At a meeting convened in May to address contentious issues including Abyei, the NCP-SPLM joint leadership chose instead to refer the issues to the presidency, which has yet to deliver its decisions. In August, the parties established a new layer of joint committees, and the issue of Abyei is now in the hands of a subcommittee of the NCP-SPLM Joint Political Committee.

15. Altogether, the parties have so far failed to give other obligations under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement sufficient priority, despite the fact that the joint Government continues to function. Hardly any action has been taken to start preparing for national elections, originally scheduled for mid-2008, but deferred to mid-2009 by the Interim National Constitution.

16. Few of the commissions called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement function as originally intended. The National Constitutional Review Commission, charged with reviewing national legislation, has not met this year. The National Assembly has passed only one act establishing a commission, and the National Constitutional Review Commission did not review that act as required by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Legislation necessary to establish the National Human Rights, Civil Service, Land and Electoral Commissions is still pending. However, there are encouraging signs of the National Assembly emerging as a vibrant forum for broad political dialogue. During the second session, parliamentarians from a wide variety of political parties held intensive discussions on a number of national issues and issues related to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

17. The parties have also fallen behind schedule in implementing the legislative reform agenda required by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The National Assembly concluded its three-month second session in July without passing any legislation related to the Agreement. At its next session, the National Assembly is expected to consider critical draft legislation on electoral issues, political parties and the national security sector. However, the parties have not yet released drafts for public discussion. Those laws will have a major effect on the future of the country.

18. The Assessment and Evaluation Commission continues to monitor implementation through its plenary and four working groups, which focus on power-sharing, wealth-sharing, security and the three areas dealt with separately in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Protocols, i.e. Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. On 16 August, UNMIS joined the Assessment and Evaluation Commission at its eleventh plenary meeting as an ex officio member, and was welcomed by the parties and other international members of the Commission. However, the parties have not displayed sufficient interest in the Commission, nor are they yet fully utilizing the mechanism to advance the peace process.

19. For its part, SPLM is facing the natural challenges of transforming itself from a liberation movement into an inclusive political party and government that reflect the diversity of the peoples of southern Sudan. Its Interim Political Bureau, charged with overseeing internal party reform, was endorsed in April 2006 in Rumbek, and the second party convention was expected to be convened before the end of the year.

20. During the early stages of the reporting period, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) continued to attack civilians and destabilize the area along the Sudan's borders with Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Military efforts have so far failed to eliminate it as a threat, in part because of coordination difficulties among the affected states. Following an extended effort of the Government of Southern Sudan, the Government of Uganda and LRA launched talks in Juba on 14 July, mediated by the Government of Southern Sudan. The negotiators face a number of complex and contentious issues, but the current talks are unprecedented. In Juba, on 26 August, the Government of Uganda and LRA signed a

cessation of hostilities agreement that requires LRA members to assemble at two designated points in southern Sudan.

III. Implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan

Political support and reconciliation

21. In accordance with paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1590 (2005), UNMIS continued to provide good offices and political support in several areas to help implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and resolve other conflicts in the Sudan. In southern Sudan, UNMIS used its good offices to help restore calm in a number of volatile situations, including the clashes caused by the forced disarmament campaign in Jonglei and the Rubkona market incident. Starting on 11 August, UNMIS convened several emergency meetings of the Area Joint Military Committee to secure a halt to the fighting between the SPLA and the SAF-aligned Pangak Peace Force in sector III (Malakal). Also, UNMIS liaison and good relations with most commanders of SAF, SPLA and other armed groups proved crucial in de-escalating the tense situation in Upper Nile State. More broadly, UNMIS continues to perform an important early warning role throughout southern Sudan, identifying and acting to defuse intercommunal tensions.

22. UNMIS has monitored the Eritrean-mediated talks between the Sudanese Government and the Eastern Front, which began in Asmara on 13 June. The parties decided not to involve other international actors in the talks at this stage, and did not take up the UNMIS offer of technical and expert support for the negotiations. Eritrea's role in the talks also confirms the warming of relations between Eritrea and the Sudan; on 12 June, the Presidents of the Sudan and Eritrea met for the first time in more than five years.

23. UNMIS also assisted in efforts to implement and build support for the Darfur Peace Agreement. The Mission continued to persuade the non-signatory groups to support the Agreement, and participated in the work of the African Union (AU)-led Joint Commission and Ceasefire Commissions. The United Nations organized six workshops in Nyala and El-Fashir to explain the Darfur Peace Agreement, targeting a wide range of stakeholders, including the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), civil society organizations, women's groups and traditional leaders. UNMIS also provided its good offices to promote discussions between AMIS and internally displaced persons in Zalingei, allowing the latter to express their concerns and the former to resume patrol activities in the camps.

24. During the reporting period, UNMIS support for AMIS increased substantially in line with the additional tasks and responsibilities that AMIS has assumed under the Darfur Peace Agreement. AMIS developed a new concept of operations, which the AU Peace and Security Council approved on 27 June. UNMIS also responded to AU requests for assistance relating to communications, logistics, transportation, public information and humanitarian issues. The United Nations and AU are currently formulating a support package for AMIS to enhance its capability and help it to implement its mandated tasks. However, the position of the Sudanese Government with regard to Security Council resolution 1706 (2006) and transition of peacekeeping responsibilities in Darfur from AU to the United Nations has been

very negative. The United Nations will continue to engage Khartoum on this very important issue.

Military deployment and activities

25. UNMIS has now deployed almost all of its expected total of 9,880 military personnel. As at 4 September, 8,727 troops, 695 military observers and 186 staff officers drawn from 61 countries had taken up their duties in the Sudan.

26. With the completion of SPLA redeployment to the south, UNMIS Redeployment Coordination Headquarters, based in Kassala, had fulfilled its tasks in eastern Sudan, and its drawdown was initiated on 1 August. While Redeployment Coordination Headquarters staff officers from Nepal and Germany will be repatriated, the Nepalese infantry company will deploy to another United Nations peacekeeping operation, and military observers have been reassigned to sectors in the South. At a farewell ceremony held on 29 July, the Wali of Kassala stressed that United Nations agencies could continue their humanitarian work in the region unhindered. I would like to take this opportunity to recognize the important role of the Redeployment Coordination Headquarters in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in eastern Sudan.

27. In recent months, UNMIS has bolstered its presence and security in Equatoria. As the Council will recall, the Mission is mandated to help protect civilians facing an imminent threat within its areas of deployment and capabilities. With respect to LRA, the role of UNMIS is currently limited to coordination and information-sharing with the Sudanese authorities, other affected Member States and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as described in my report of 29 June 2006 (S/2006/478).

28. Regrettably, the Sudanese customs service in Port Sudan and Khartoum delayed for extended periods the release of a wide range of items, including food rations. It had held some major communications equipment since February and generally clears United Nations stores and supplies at an extremely slow pace, creating significant logistical obstacles to the operation of UNMIS forces. UNMIS has protested many times, and at many levels, to the Government about this issue. The situation has now slightly improved; however, UNMIS communications equipment has yet to be released.

29. In the meantime, customs delays and rain-related road closures have increased the reliance of UNMIS on air and water transport. The Russian, Indian and Pakistani military aviation units are now fully deployed and operational, but are not yet cleared by the United Nations Secretariat for night operations. The force riverine unit has proved effective in deploying joint monitoring teams and force protection elements along the Nile within its operational range of 100 kilometres from its base. On 17 August, unidentified gunmen fired at a boat belonging to the United Nations riverine unit, which was transporting a joint monitoring team near Malakal. Two Indian soldiers and one SAF national monitor were injured. I am very concerned about this instance of deliberate targeting of UNMIS personnel, which UNMIS considers a serious violation of the ceasefire.

30. As at 4 September, UNMIS had chaired 35 meetings of the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee. Despite slow progress on a number of issues, the Committee continues to provide a useful forum for open and results-oriented discussion. After a

long delay, both parties have now submitted to the Committee information on the structure of their respective forces. Upon completion of analysis of those data, the information may significantly assist in the monitoring and verification of SAF and SPLA strength and disposition of forces.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

31. Although the Northern and Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commissions have been set up to lead and implement the interim disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, overall progress in the implementation and preparation of the multi-year disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme has been slow. The Commissions continued to need capable and motivated staff, as well as adequate budgets for their operations, in order to boost their capacities. However, the absence of some key decision-making national bodies, particularly the National Council for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination, continued to limit the authority of the Commissions.

32. In the course of June, the SPLA forced civilian disarmament campaign met with some violent resistance in Jonglei State. In response, UNMIS, together with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) led efforts to support the civilian disarmament programme in Akobo county, in order to promote non-coercive disarmament. UNMIS also resumed training support for 420 SPLA data collectors for the registration of SPLA troops, and has offered similar training support to SAF for the other armed groups aligned with it. In the meantime, 650 demobilized child combatants from SPLA were reunified with their families.

33. During the reporting period, the Northern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, with the support of UNMIS, demobilized and provided reinsertion support to 122 women and disabled ex-combatants from SAF-aligned other armed groups.

Electoral assistance

34. Security Council resolution 1590 (2005) mandated UNMIS to provide guidance and technical assistance to the parties to support their preparations for and conduct of elections and referendums provided for by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. During the reporting period, UNMIS completed an initial assessment of electoral legislation and initiated discussions with parliamentarians, National Electoral Commissioners, the Registrar for Political Parties, political party leaders and civil society representatives. Recruitment for the UNMIS Electoral Unit is ongoing. The Unit will provide capacity-building and sustainable technical assistance to the National Electoral Commission, serve as focal point for electoral matters and coordinate international assistance to the electoral process.

Police

35. As at 1 September, UNMIS had deployed 666 United Nations police officers from 42 countries, who are currently stationed at 21 team sites, representing over 90 per cent of the authorized strength. Following agreement with the Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS), United Nations police officers are now working alongside the local police leadership in the areas of Juba and Kadugli.

36. On the recommendation of UNMIS, SSPS established the Police Development Committee in May to formulate policy and coordinate capacity-building efforts. The Inspector-General of Police chairs the Committee, which includes representatives of SPLM, the Government of National Unity and international agencies. Also, with UNMIS support, the Committee has drafted a framework and action plan for community policing in Juba. The UNMIS police component has drafted a code of conduct for the Sudan police, which is awaiting approval, and is prepared to play a leading role in SSPS officer training, providing an initial pool of 34 trainers for this purpose. SSPS has also approved an UNMIS proposal to develop a system intended to identify and register all SSPS personnel and issue each with an identification card. The implementation of this project began in June with the registration of senior SSPS officials, and as at 1 September almost 2,000 police officers had been registered. At the national level, UNMIS and other United Nations agencies are planning to begin human rights training for Government of National Unity police in Khartoum in September 2006. In the meantime, the Mission will continue its discussions with the Government of National Unity to identify other opportunities to assist the police in northern Sudan.

Human rights

37. The parties made little progress in establishing human rights commissions called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. On 27 June, President Kiir of southern Sudan issued a decree naming five members of the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission, though the Commission itself does not yet formally exist. President Kiir asked the designated Commissioners to collaborate in finalizing the necessary legislation. In response to this development, UNMIS organized a workshop for the designated Commissioners to familiarize them with relevant human rights issues. At the national level, however, the National Assembly did not consider a draft act to establish the National Human Rights Commission before its three-month recess, which began in July. During the reporting period, UNMIS organized a workshop with the Advisory Council for Human Rights in which civil society groups called for amendments to the draft act, and another one with the National Assembly's Human Rights Standing Committee on international human rights treaties to which the Sudan is a party. In August, in cooperation with the Khartoum State police, UNMIS organized a series of workshops on human rights and law enforcement aimed at introducing and promoting international human rights standards within the national police force.

Rule of law

38. During the period under review, UNMIS assisted the Government of Southern Sudan authorities in preparing a training programme for corrections staff in southern Sudan, and in Rumbek, from 18 to 27 July, trained 100 Government of Southern Sudan corrections officers in the United Nations standard minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners. On 26 July, UNDP and UNMIS trained 250 police officers in Juba on the topic "Rule of law principles and the criminal justice chain". The Government of Southern Sudan has requested UNMIS to co-locate corrections experts in major prisons in order to provide advice and training to local staff. UNMIS will need to second 25 prison experts from Member States to meet that request. UNDP has also conducted capacity-building activities for national rule-of-law institutions and actors, including the organization of three study tours for

members of the National Judicial Services Commission. Through the Government of Southern Sudan Budget Sector Working Group, UNMIS and UNDP helped the Government to plan and budget for rule-of-law institutions up to 2009.

Public information

39. UNMIS Radio started broadcasting in Juba on 30 June. The new station, Miraya ("Mirror") FM, broadcasts continuously and airs news bulletins in English, Arabic and Juba Arabic, which are updated three times per day. The Government of Southern Sudan has approved the roll-out of Miraya FM throughout southern Sudan, and UNMIS now plans to complete coverage of the largest population centres in southern Sudan by the end of the year. However, the Khartoum authorities continued their opposition to UNMIS Radio broadcasting in the North, despite the obligation under the status-of-forces agreement to allow it to broadcast countrywide.

40. In July, UNMIS attended the Joint Media Commission's first meeting since August 2005. The meeting discussed dissemination of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, including by using UNMIS materials for print, radio and television. However, no concrete decisions were taken. UNMIS obtained buildings for outreach centres in Kadugli and Malakal and is negotiating for outreach centres in Juba and Khartoum. UNMIS also continued to support AU in its efforts to disseminate the Darfur Peace Agreement in Darfur through workshops, website support and the production of radio programmes.

Humanitarian assistance

41. The humanitarian situation in southern Sudan remains stable and has led to increased activity and optimism among the international aid community. Between January and early June this year, international assistance contributed to the construction or repair of 370 kilometres of road. This in turn has supported the return of over 10,000 refugees to southern Sudan and the delivery of food aid to 5 million people, as well as polio immunization for 4.8 million children. While activities are temporarily restricted by seasonal rains at the moment, they are expected to resume at normal levels by October or November.

42. In Darfur, however, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated sharply since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May. Where reliable access exists, the humanitarian community continues to deliver a strong multisectoral programme, helping to maintain the gains in health, nutrition, water and sanitation that it has achieved since August 2004. However, reduced access in other areas, increased violence towards humanitarian actors and a weakening of the position of AMIS are beginning to reverse these hard-won humanitarian gains. During the reporting period, humanitarian access reached its lowest levels since 2003 (below 60 per cent). Populations are suffering from both the increased instability and violence and the diminished ability of humanitarian workers to reach them. Perceptions of AMIS partiality have reduced the confidence of internally displaced persons in the AU Mission, leading to reduced security as AMIS withdrew from several camps. Humanitarian needs are likely to increase in the short term, as displacements have reduced planting this season, leading to a much-diminished harvest in November.

43. The Government continued to restrict humanitarian access in Kassala, Red Sea and Gedaref States. While bilateral arrangements have facilitated access for some agencies, further restrictions were being imposed towards the end of August. Access

for humanitarian personnel in Abyei improved, despite ongoing restrictions on the movement of UNMIS monitors. The lack of a civil administration in Abyei continued to delay the transition from humanitarian assistance to recovery programmes, increasing the risk of a humanitarian crisis.

Protection of civilians

44. During the reporting period, police in Northern Sudan carried out raids on camps for internally displaced persons, relocation sites and squatter areas around Khartoum. Such raids are regularly accompanied by violence, abuse and extortions. On 16 and 17 August, authorities evicted some 12,000 internally displaced persons in Dar Assalam, south of Khartoum, and demolished about 3,500 houses in a day. Reports suggest that authorities killed and injured an unknown number of internally displaced persons during the operations. UNMIS, which to date has been denied all access to the area, is pressing for immediate high-level Government measures to address the needs of the relocated populations and to prevent further abuses. In this connection, I would like to remind the Sudanese authorities of the willingness and capability of United Nations agencies and partners to assist them in planning the relocation process for communities, including the proper preparation of sites and provision of services.

45. In southern Sudan, enhanced cooperation between agencies and UNMIS helped ensure coordinated responses to protection issues arising from ongoing insecurity. For example, when civilians were attacked and looted in Jonglei by militia members resisting forcible disarmament, UNMIS rapidly deployed inter-agency assessment teams from Malakal and Juba.

46. The inclusion of children in armed forces in the Sudan remains a grave concern, as described in my report to the Security Council of 17 August (S/2006/662). In Southern Sudan, child soldiers are most often associated with other armed groups.

Returns

47. During the reporting period, returns to the three areas (Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile) and the south dwindled as the rains made many roads impassable; small numbers of returnees are still arriving by barge. However, the returns are likely to resume on a large scale in October. The Government of Southern Sudan intends to organize the return of as many as possible of the 680,000 people who are already registered with State authorities to return. In response to the ambitious plans of the Government of Southern Sudan, the United Nations provided technical support for organized returns to ensure they are conducted according to international standards. Providing effective and timely reintegration and recovery assistance to communities in areas with large numbers of returnees remains a critical challenge.

48. In Darfur, the security situation did not allow for returns. Instead, UNMIS activities focused on preparedness for return contingencies, enabling agencies to respond effectively should the situation change. Existing mechanisms, particularly agreements with the Government, will remain central tools for ensuring that any returns that take place do so under conditions of voluntariness, safety and dignity.

Mine action

49. Landmines and unexploded ordnance continue to constitute a major threat to the population in many parts of the Sudan, as well as to United Nations staff and humanitarian personnel operating on the ground. However, UNMIS mine action teams have made major progress in demining activities and mine education. To date, 7 million square metres of suspected dangerous areas have been cleared, and some 2,100 anti-personnel mines, over 900 anti-tank mines and some 270,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance and small-arms ammunition have been destroyed. UNMIS and the United Nations Children's Fund have provided mine-risk education to more than 834,000 people. UNMIS has provided briefings on landmine safety to over 2,400 staff working with the Mission or other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, while 179 staff have been trained as trainers.

50. UNMIS mine action teams prioritized the clearing of humanitarian routes in the Nuba Mountains, Juba, Rumbek, Wau, Yei, Malakal, Ed Damazin and Darfur. Over 1,200 kilometres of roads have been verified or cleared for emergency deployment and aid delivery. The road from Kadugli to Fama, closed for 16 years, can now be reopened. However, as these efforts have come to a halt during the rainy season, the focus has shifted to the recruitment and training of deminers. Three UNMIS demining contingents from Egypt (Kadugli), Kenya (Wau) and Bangladesh (Juba), have commenced operations. Pakistani units have been issued with provisional accreditation and are awaiting deployment to Kurmuk by the end of August. Cambodian units in Malakal are going through in-country training for final accreditation and are expected to be fully operational by the end of the rainy season.

51. The National Mine Action Authority, launched in March 2006, met for the first time in August and approved the National Mine Action Strategic Framework. UNMIS has supported and implemented several national capacity-development activities of the Authority, including an eight-week training course for Joint Integrated Demining Unit personnel and seven national mine-action capacity-development courses to develop the technical and managerial skills of national and international mine-action staff.

Economic recovery and reconstruction

52. The economy continues to grow rapidly, while inflation remains subdued. Real GDP growth is projected at 12 per cent for 2006, strengthened by higher oil receipts and buoyant activity in the non-oil sector. However, a decrease in oil production during the first half of the year caused both the fiscal and the external current account balances to deteriorate. Average inflation fell from 8.5 per cent in December 2005 to 5.4 per cent in June 2006. The favourable inflation performance is reflected in lower food prices, among other indicators. Unfortunately, most private-sector gains remain confined to Khartoum, and benefits are reaped primarily by the elite and higher income earners. The United Nations, the World Bank and the African Development Bank initiated the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission under the Darfur Peace Agreement in The Hague on 21 and 22 June. The Joint Assessment Mission is designed to provide rapid implementation in relation to urgent needs, and better planning and coordination of longer-term development requirements, based on the identified needs of Darfurians. However, the escalation of violence in Darfur severely impeded the work of the Mission.

53. Donor support continues to lag behind needs with respect to humanitarian requirements. By the end of August 2006, donor pledges met only 56 per cent ($896.5 million) of identified humanitarian work-plan requirements. With respect to recovery and development, while donor commitments lagged, participants at the first Sudan Consortium meeting in March 2006 agreed that a principal challenge has been the slow disbursements of paid-in contributions through the multi-donor trust funds. The World Bank structure and administration of the trust funds have proved ill-suited to meet immediate post-conflict requirements. This has been compounded by the fact that the capacity of the Government of Southern Sudan is still nascent. Since the Oslo conference, approximately $430 million of the $2.6 billion needed for post-conflict reconstruction, as identified by the Joint Assessment Mission, has been committed. With respect to the multi-donor trust funds, less than $12 million had been disbursed for programming by the end of July 2006.

Gender

54. While some progress has been made in opening space for discussion of gender issues since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, many challenges to the political and economic empowerment of women in the Sudan remain. UNMIS began drafting a training manual for women candidates for the national elections, and began working with police officers in Southern Kordofan on improving sensitivity to victims of gender-based violence. Within UNMIS, the Gender Unit distributed copies of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and the Secretary-General's bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13).

HIV/AIDS

55. The UNMIS HIV/AIDS Unit continued providing voluntary counselling and testing services, induction courses and HIV sensitization for peacekeeping contingents in the sectors. The Unit also trained 32 SPLA HIV/AIDS change agents in Rumbek as part of the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme. In addition, awareness training reached some 1,200 SPLA members, and about 1,000 internally displaced persons in Lologo way station, in Juba. The Unit assisted the Sudan National AIDS Programme in drafting a project proposal for HIV/AIDS awareness among SAF members.

Conduct and discipline

56. The UNMIS Conduct and Discipline Unit continues to be engaged in active prevention, enforcement and outreach activities to ensure that all Mission personnel comply with the United Nations code of conduct for the Sudan. All new staff now receive extensive induction training on the code of conduct and on sexual exploitation and abuse. During the reporting period, UNMIS also launched a public information strategy on United Nations standards of conduct and developed and implemented a standard operating procedure for reporting misconduct. As a result of an investigation, one staff member was dismissed for sexual exploitation in connection with an incident that occurred in 2005. As at 28 August, 33 similar cases were under active investigation; in 8 of those cases, reports are being awaited from the Office of Internal Oversight Services.

Status-of-forces agreement

57. There is a major concern about several apparent breaches of the Government's commitments under the status-of-forces agreement. During the reporting period, SAF personnel continued to prevent UNMIS movement north of Abyei, restricting the United Nations monitoring to only 20 per cent of the sector, which is also in violation of the Government's obligations under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. At the same time, the Government continues to arrest and detain national UNMIS staff, in violation of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the status-of-forces agreement. The obstacles to clearing UNMIS materiel through customs and the refusal to allow UNMIS Radio to broadcast in northern Sudan are also in breach of obligations under the status-of-forces agreement.

IV. Observations

58. One year after the inauguration of the Government of National Unity, the parties have made progress, albeit on a limited scale, in carrying out their commitments under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. While they are observing their security commitments reasonably well, the implementation of several other major provisions of the Agreement has fallen behind schedule. Disappointingly, the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement appears to be selective. The parties have not been able to resolve some important contentious issues, and little progress has been made in the crucial areas of power- and wealth-sharing which together form the cornerstone of the Agreement, including in respect of Abyei, oil revenues, the north-south border and other armed groups. In addition, the parties have so far done too little to begin preparing for national elections. They should be reminded that none of the commitments enshrined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement are optional. The parties must meet all their obligations promptly and fully.

59. While various ceasefire bodies envisaged in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement are working well, the ongoing restrictions imposed on the activities of UNMIS monitors in and around Abyei constitute a clear violation of the Agreement. This is of particular concern because the inability of UNMIS to operate properly in northern Abyei only heightens suspicions between the parties. It is also unacceptable that the Ceasefire Political Commission has failed to reach a political compromise on this pivotal issue. I urge that body to resolve the matter expeditiously.

60. The deliberate attack by unidentified armed men on a joint monitoring team on 17 August near Malakal is particularly alarming. The Ceasefire Joint Military Committee is investigating the incident, including the allegations about the involvement of other armed groups. I call on the two parties to ensure that the perpetrators of the crime are identified and held to account, and that no such incidents occur in the future.

61. The people of the Sudan have high expectations of peace dividends under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. To date, those expectations have not been met. The United Nations has expanded humanitarian activities and increased recovery interventions considerably, with only limited resources at its disposal. However, accelerated implementation of recovery and development programmes, in particular through multi-donor trust funds, will be critical in order to help build public support

for the peace, especially in the south and the three areas. At the same time, donors will need to make good on the commitments they made at the Oslo pledging conference in 2005. I renew my call to the international community to fulfil its pledges in a timely and effective manner.

62. The implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is entering a new and challenging phase. In the months ahead, the parties must make substantial progress on the difficult tasks related to security-sector reform, police reform and restructuring, preparing for the return of internally displaced persons, the national census and future elections, while continuing active and determined disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes to reduce the scourge of small arms. I call on the international community to support the Sudanese people as they confront these new challenges, and to lend financial, technical and political assistance to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement agenda.

63. It is clear that implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement remains a daunting challenge. There can be no harvest without planting; and if the international community wishes the Sudan to reap the harvest of a durable peace by the end of the interim period envisaged in the Agreement, everything possible should be done to perform the task of planting the seeds of sustainable peace and development.

64. The Sudan's own history confirms that peace is indivisible. The progress that is being made in the talks on eastern Sudan is encouraging, and I hope that they will lead to a full and lasting agreement. However, efforts to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement will prove inadequate until durable peace also comes to Darfur. Conversely, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement remains the bedrock on which the Darfur Peace Agreement, however unsteady it may appear now, could be built. The people and the leaders of the Sudan, with the active support of the international community, must tend to both if the country is to finally emerge from conflict and instability.

65. I sincerely hope that the leaders of the Sudan are fully aware of the possible consequences of their negative reaction to the generous proposals of the international community with regard to Darfur, which are based on the Darfur Peace Agreement and the joint position of the African Union and the United Nations concerning the strengthening of AMIS and the transition to the United Nations. There cannot be a lasting solution in Darfur through coercion and violence. The United Nations is therefore prepared to seek the political path, as was agreed by the Sudanese themselves at Abuja. I am ready to continue to engage all parties involved in order to pursue this path. The Security Council has a key role to play in this process, but its effectiveness will depend on its ability to speak and act in complete unity. Ultimately, however, the leaders in Khartoum bear full responsibility for the route they may finally choose.

66. In conclusion, I wish to thank my Special Representative and all United Nations staff for their tireless efforts to help bring peace to the people of the Sudan. In this context, I recommend that the Security Council renew the mandate of UNMIS for a period of 12 months, until 24 September 2007.

Annex

Military and police strength as at 27 August 2006

	Military component									
	Observers		*Troops*		*Staff officers*		*Total*		*Civilian police*	
Country	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*
Argentina									0	11
Australia	0	6			3	6	3	12	2	8
Austria						2		2		
Bangladesh	0	23	0	1 501	0	26	0	1 548	3	26
Belgium	0	4					0	4		
Benin	0	7					0	7		
Bolivia	0	15					0	15		
Botswana	0	5					0	5		
Bosnia									1	1
Brazil	0	24					0	24	0	3
Burkina Faso	0	7					0	7		
Cambodia	0	15	0	135	0	1	0	151		
Canada	2	23			1	5	3	28	0	2
China	0	15	7	428		8	7	451	2	13
Croatia					0	3	0	3		
Denmark					0	6	0	6		
Ecuador	0	20					0	20		
Egypt	0	21	16	780		19	16	820		
El Salvador	0	5					0	5	1	5
Fiji	0	8					0	8	0	5
Finland					0	2	0	2	0	2
Gabon	0	10					0	10		
Gambia									4	15
Germany	0	34			0	3	0	37	0	4
Ghana									6	35
Greece	0	4			0	2	0	6		
Guatemala	0	8					0	8		
Guinea	0	16					0	16		
India	0	26	4	2 571		25	4	2 622	1	29
Indonesia	0	13					0	13		
Jamaica									2	5
Jordan	0	15			0	8	0	23	0	10

	Military component									
	Observers		Troops		Staff officers		Total		Civilian police	
Country	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Kenya	0	10	32	786		6	33	802	1	20
Kyrgyzstan	3	7					3	7	0	1
Malawi	0	7			0	1	0	8		
Malaysia	0	10			0	3	0	13	0	10
Mali	0	15					0	15		
Mongolia	0	2					0	2		
Mozambique	0	3					0	1		
Namibia	0	10					0	10	0	1
Nepal	2	8	2	221		4	4	233	1	54
Netherlands	1	13			2	1	15	2	10	
New Zealand	0	2			0	1	0	3		
Nigeria	0	8					0	8	4	45
Norway	1	19				7	1	26	0	4
Pakistan	0	22	0	1 542	0	23	0	1 587	0	44
Paraguay	0	10					0	10		
Peru	0	17					0	17		
Philippines	0	20					0	20	0	55
Poland	0	2					0	2		
Republic of Korea	0	7					0	7		
Republic of Moldova	0	2					0	2		
Romania	0	12					0	12		
Russian Federation	0	15	0	120	0	2	0	15	0	13
Rwanda	0	18	0	254	0	2	0	274	0	20
Samoa									0	17
Sri Lanka	0	6					0	6	0	23
Sweden	0	3			0	1	0	4	0	8
Thailand	1	14					1	14		
Turkey					0	4	0	4	0	28
Uganda	0	10					0	10	2	17
Ukraine	0	13					0	13	1	23
United Kingdom					0	3	0	3		
United Republic of Tanzania	1	19					1	19	0	3
Uruguay									0	2
United States of America									2	5

	Military component								Civilian police	
	Observers		Troops		Staff officers		Total			
Country	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Vanuatu									0	6
Yemen	0	20					0	20	0	3
Zambia	0	15	13	325		7	13	338	0	19
Zimbabwe	2	19					2	19	0	26
Total per gender	**13**	**682**	**75**	**8 653**	**4**	**182**	**92**	**9 516**	**41**	**625**
Total	**695**		**8 727**		**186**		**9 608**		**666**	



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